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| image borrowed from Radio Liberty |
It is hard to imagine that two countries, on opposite sides of the world, would remain at odd with one another, in their quest for self-determination, more or less under the same basic principles that the people that they govern, should be the ruling class. Nevertheless, opposing philosophies on the manner in which self-determination should be pursued, were at the core of the argument. Administrations would be plagued by differences of opinion, in peace and in war, for nearly 100 years; differences that continue today, primarily through domestic and international propaganda machines. It is hard to say exactly what would have happened, had the United States perceived the Russians as only a different manner of democracy, than its own. Both powers rose to dominance in the twentieth century, after watching European powers squabble over ridiculous manners and entangle themselves in unworthy alliances. Both powers demanded the right of self-determination, and attempted to impose their will upon the rest of the world. Imposing their own brand of government on the rest of the world was really at the heart of the matter. In the interests of business, defending the same and spreading their own political ideology to the far corners of the world, was perceived to be necessitated to protect their own political ideology. The issue would start in a portion of the world, which was relatively backward, politically and economically, comparatively speaking and would continue to be source of frustration for both sides, in their quest for domination of the Asian continent, apparently perceived to be the key to the world.
Manchuria
The stage was set in 1895 for the future on-again, off-again, relations between the United States and Russia, in the region of Manchuria, China. The Japanese had defeated Chinese forces in 1895, proving to the world that the Manchu Dynasty was impotent, and the powers of the world turned their attention to attempting to exert their own brand of influence in this region of the world, which had been previously closed to them, in the form of colonial holdings. Russia quickly moved on this new revelation and entered into the Li-Lobanov Treaty with China in 1896, obtaining the necessary concessions to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria. Other states of the world began moving in quickly thereafter, in what was perceived as a wholesale land-grab, but not before the Russians secured a 25-year lease on the Laitung peninsula, all the way to Port Arthur, enabling them to construct the South Manchuria Railway. It soon became obvious to the rest of the world, that Russia was attempting more than just social domination of the region, but also economic domination, through a relatively well-prepared transportation infrastructure. (Ferrell, 51-52)
The United States, arrived on the scene shortly after the defeat by Japan, to demand their share of the division of spoils in China, though the United States was more interested in maintaining the free trade that it already enjoyed. As Ohio Republican John Sherman said, in 1897, “the statesmen of China will understand, that in our case foreign control does not mean territorial absorption or government interference.” (Schulzinger, 20) The Open Door policy, as it was to be referred to, began to take shape. It was not particularly well liked by most of the powers of the world, but was in-line with the most dominant colonial power in the world, Britain, and was quietly accepted. Relations between Russia and the United States had been good up to this point, but the death of President McKinley, brought a new brand of foreign policy to the United States government, one that was decidedly more aggressive. Indeed, the incoming Theodore Roosevelt viewed Russia as a “barbarous despotism”, and a threat to United States interests and influence in Manchuria, China. (Schulzinger, 31)
In February of 1904, conflict erupted between Russia and Japan over Port Arthur, in southern Manchuria. Japan had been insisting that the port was part of their sphere of influence, since their defeat of the Chinese, despite Russia’s treaty with China. As the war dragged on in to 1905, Russia began to convulse under the despotism of the Czar’s rule, revolution was eminent, and a democratic uprising appeared in St. Petersburg. Initially, the United States perceived this as an encouraging sign that a democracy was about to take hold. Unfortunately, the US ambassador in St. Petersburg detailed quite the opposite. Revolutionary forces in the Russian capital were reported as being composed primarily of Socialist and Communists. While President Roosevelt did not care for the Russian Czar, he thought that the political radicals attempting to cease power in the state were of the worst sort. Observing the need for a quick end to the Russo-Japanese War, President Roosevelt quickly injected himself as mediator in the conflict, so that the Russian military might return to stabilize their government. Peace was finally assured, with Treaty of Portsmouth, though neither side was particularly pleased with the arrangement. The Japanese thought that they had conceded too much, and had gained nothing, in their rather successful campaign against the Russians, but the Russians persisted in their refusal to pay indemnities, or turn over Port Arthur, which President Roosevelt had aided the Russians in retaining, out of fear of extended Japanese control of the region. While President Roosevelt did receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on this treaty, the Russian and Japanese governments undermined his plans a year later, by joining together to ensure that North China and Manchuria were divided along their interests, rather than the United States’. (Schulzinger, 31-34) (Ferrell, 59)
Without conflict, there was very little that President Roosevelt could do about the situation between Russia and Japan, acknowledging that each of those states had a right to dominate, considering their proximity to the region. Now that Russian and Japan were getting along, the situation stabilized, and President Roosevelt’s disdain for business affairs caused the Open Door policy to weaken, until the following administration. The Russian and the Japanese did abide by the treaty developed by President Roosevelt though; both evacuated Manchuria in 1907, leaving only railroad guards, and control was returned to China. (Legrand, 99)
President Taft took office in 1908 and immediately began to encourage investment in China, as a way of countering the Russian-Japanese influence, coupled with a proposal by the State Department to neutralization of the railways in Manchuria. (Schulzinger, 43) This was likely to due to the appearance of strong support for the ideas of Karl Marx, not only continuing expansion throughout Russia, but also beginning to emerge in China (Legrand, 105). Unfortunately, the plan to neutralize the transport system was not received very well by anyone. Japan and Russia were determined to maintain control of their respective railway interests, and concluded a new agreement regarding the same in 1910. In addition, European interest in dominating the economy of China, resulted in a spider web of alliances, which the United States was hesitant to interfere with, except as it pertained to maintaining an open trade policy within China, but the situation was to remain confused and matter of contention for several more years. (Ferrell, 60-63)
The tangled web of alliances was not peculiar to the Asian situation. Throughout the world, European states were creating alliances that were soon to drag the world in to a war, such as nobody had seen before. The United States remained aloof during this time, focusing more on its own domestic issues and interests in Central America; Russia was equally as self-absorbed, after the success of revolutionary demands from within. The coming of the first World War, and Japanese aggression in Asia, would bring the two powers together again out of necessity, while at the same time widening the rift that had begun with President Roosevelt’s interference in the Russo-Japanese War. (Hunt, 842)
The World at War
After several years of mounting tension in Europe, the dam finally broke in the 1912 Balkans, and Russia was dragged into the conflict, through its alliance with France. The United States, through the patient guidance of President Woodrow Wilson, managed to refrain from entering the war, until 1917. Cooperating with Russia, up to this point, was simply part of the business arrangement of supplying the allies during World War I, and a necessity to defeat German forces. (Legrand, 172)
Just as the United States was entering the war, Russia was facing defeat at the hands of the Germans, as well as internal strife that eventually lead to the abdication, and death of the Czar, at the hands of the Bolsheviks. This was most certainly a turning point in relations between the United States and Russia, as the United States had already stated its standing opposition to Communist movements around the world. (Schulzinger, 84-85) This position would increasingly strain relations between the two governments through the present.
Adding to the strain of the situation, shortly after the Bolsheviks took power in Russia, they moved to end hostilities with Germany, and signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which stripped the country of all of the provinces west of the Ukraine. (Scott) This treaty was the beginning of Russia’s troubles with the West. Under the guise of protecting supply lines from the German army, military goals soon turned political, as 7,000 US Marines began encouraging and aiding anti-Bolshevik forces, known as the “whites”, leading the Russians to break ties with the United States. (Hunt, 238)
Until the end of the war, battle between “whites” and “reds” continued, with full support for the “whites” by the allied governments, out of nothing more than fear of the spread of the Communist revolution that had seized power in Russia, and was showing signs of spreading across Eastern Europe. (Smele) The allies maintained their refusal to acknowledge the new revolutionary government in Russia, coupling that with the treaty, refusing to allow the Russians at the peace conference, suggesting that they had already made their peace with Germany. (Hunt, 251) In addition, it was likely, as with their omission of the Germans in the peace talks, the allies likely wanted space to be able to consider the question of what exactly they should do about the Bolsheviks. Return of the land to Russia, granted to Germany in their treaty with Russia somewhat soothed tensions with that new government, the creation of Poland out of that territory, served to emphasize the fact that the allies were not favoring Russia wholly.
Following the Peace of Paris, fear of Communism continued to grip the allied powers, as it continued to spread across Eastern Europe. In the United States, a nationwide campaign was launched to ensure that the United States motion picture industry would “do all that is within its power to upbuild and strengthen the spirit of Americanism within our people.” (Hunt, 259) Following that up, the Department of Justice directly attacked supporters of the ideology by arresting nearly 3000 in raids across the country, and on the other side of the world, the Russians stepped up their campaign against capitalism, in much the same manner (Hunt, 262). Otherwise, the United States was rather tired of war and foreign policy and began a road of isolationism, fueled by financial disagreements with the powers of Europe, and Russia continued to attempt to stabilize itself within
With the Great Depression looming on the horizon, trouble appeared again in Manchuria. This time, China and Russia went to war over the Chinese Eastern Railway, despite the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Russian government was still unrecognized, and when the United States attempted to communicate with Russia over the affair, the Russian Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, used the public press to tell the United States to mind its own business. (Ferrell, 180-181) Ultimately, the Chinese expelled the Russians, and thereby planted seeds of concern with the Japanese, who invaded and took control of Manchuria in 1931. (Mukden) In the grips of the Great Depression, there was little that any country could do, but allow the Japanese to have their way.
By 1933, Russia and the United States were beginning to tire of their propaganda war against each other, and with a little prodding by business community in the United States, and President Roosevelt extended formal recognition to Soviet Russia. In a note from Soviet Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litinov, Russian promised to “abstain from propaganda in the United States, extend religion freedom to American citizens in the Soviet Union, negotiate an agreement to guarantee fair trial to Americans accused of crime in Russia, and reopen the question of outstanding claims of both governments.” (Ferrell, 187) Though they would ultimately ignore their own promises, this would prove to be a beneficial arrangement later in the 1930s, as the world once again began to tumble towards global conflict. (Schulzinger, 156-157)
Despite the signing of a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939, and a mutual invasion of Poland by the two powers later that same year, Russia was invaded by Germany in 1941, facing little resistance. In control of most of Europe, Germany easily threw its full weight into the Eastern front, and pushing Russia into cooperation with the forces allied against Germany. (Hunt, 496,524) The United States, having declared neutrality early on, took advantage of the situation and arranged for a meeting of the twenty-six allied warring countries to sign the Atlantic Charter. Russia was in no position to argue the points of this arrangement, and the United States, and Britain welcomed them as allies, likely understanding that there would be no way to defeat Germany otherwise. The hidden hope was that the friendship would endure beyond the war, enticing the people of the Soviet Union to abandon Communism. (Ferrell, 207)
While the United States continued to struggle with exactly how they would safely enter the war on the side of the allies, Russia needed help, and they needed it badly. They had pinned their hopes on quick and decisive aid, and had even extracted a promise of a second front, within the year, from President Roosevelt. The United States faltered though, and met cool resistance from Britain, who had recently been booted out of France by the Germans. With that, and the past war in mind, the British were understandably hesitant to launch a full-scale second front, even with the aid of the United States. (Ferrell, 208) Meanwhile, in Russia, Leningrad was surrounded, and Moscow was under siege, while the allies continued to attempt to figure out exactly what to do next. Just when things could not have gotten any worse for the Russians, their most reliable ally, the Winter season arrived with full force, halting the German advance. In the Pacific, the United States found a reason to enter the war, as Pearl Harbor had just been devastated by Japanese attack. (Hunt, 531-532).
Despite the promises made, there was still no action from the allies, in support of Russia. They continued to hold their own, however, and by the time the allies made their move in North Africa, the Russians were holding their own against Germany. Once the North Africa was secured, the tide began to turn against the Germans, and it was beginning to look as if the allies would finally have the upper hand. Excluding Russia, the United States and Britain took the opportunity to pause for a moment and meet in Casablanca, as a bit of precursor to a meeting of the three powers, that was to be later that year in Tehran. In Casablanca, the United States and Britain decided on a policy of unconditional surrender. There was concern over this policy though, that this meeting and the policy that came forth would only create a rift between the allies and Russia. The chief military correspondent for the New York Times even went so far as to describe it as “one of the great mistakes of the war.” (Schulzinger, 187)
On the other hand, the allies likely perceived that their idea of a disintegrating Communist ideology was at hand. On May 15, 1943, the Soviet Union dissolved the Comintern, their international organization for the promotion of Communism. (Hunt, 551) If nothing else, this paved the way for more open discussion in Tehran, when the Big Three met, specifically on the topic of developing a second front, coordinating a cross-channel invasion of the European continent, and the first plan for an international peace organization. This later peace was another idea pushed on by the United States, accepted by Britain, but met with skepticism by the Russians. As well, at this point, Stalin restated his promise to enter the war against Japan, once Europe had been secured. (Ferrell, 216)
The Germans were facing certain defeat. Russia had gained control of the Eastern Front and was pushing forward, despite German request for a cease-fire, and without much of a second front in Europe, until Normandy, where the tide shifted. Soon Germany was encircled from all sides and the allies met again in Yalta to determine the fate of the post-war world. At this point in the war, Germany was definitely in a state of ruin, surrounded by the United States, Britain, and Russia. It was obvious things were not going to work out well for the Third Reich. The conference dealt with four primary issues: 1) voting in the newly formed United Nations; 2) policy on the liberated eastern European political establishments, specifically Poland; 3) governing of postwar Germany; 4) ensuring that Russia would continue to assist in the efforts against the Japanese. (Ferrell, 218-219)
The war was not over though. The Allies pressed east; while the Russians pressed on to take Berlin and most of the Eastern bloc of European countries. Though the Germans did finally surrender in May 1945, the war raged on in the Pacific. The Big Three met at Potsdam in July, to determine the fate of the Germans and the course of action for the Pacific. The conference did make progress, but publicly it was considered a failure. All of the petty differences seemed to bubble to the surface at this point. President Roosevelt had died earlier in the year, having been replaced with the hard-nosed Harry Truman, and during the conference Prime Minister Churchill was replaced, through elections in Britain, by Clement Attlee. Stalin was the only original party at the conference with a full grasp of all previous arrangements, to accompany his own agenda. He refused to change his position on Poland, stating that he could not “prevent the Poles from taking over the administration of the area up to the western Neisse River”, as well as rejecting the idea of free elections in Eastern European countries, held by the Soviets. (Potsdam)
During the conference, President Harry Truman received word of the successful test of the atomic bomb, which it had been sharing scientific information about, with the British and not the Soviets. This particular issue that would further alienate the East from the West, but for the time being would provide the a rallying point for the three powers, in their call for and immediate unconditional surrender of Japanese forces. (Ferrell, 232) The Japanese refused, and the full power of nuclear devastation was unleashed upon them, not once, but on two separate occasions. If there was any doubt, on the part of the Russians, of the power that the United States held in its hands, all doubt was obliterated with the hundreds of thousands of lives that were destroyed in Japan. (Hunt, 597)
The Nuclear Age
The use of the nuclear weapon, by the United States, had far reaching, and profound effects that are still felt today. It is likely that relations between the United States and Russia would have returned to their former, somewhat insignificant state of push-and-pull, without the weapon. Unresolved differences continued to plague both sides of the fence. The most significant unresolved issue would be the disposition of the eastern European states. The Soviets were determined that they should have friendly governments on their borders, and were taking the necessary steps to ensure that policy was affected, specifically in Poland. (Schulzinger, 203)
Meanwhile, the USSR gave the impression that it was not likely to relinquish their wartime occupation of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. Greece was in the midst of a bloody civil war between the resident Communist and Monarchists, in which British troops were struggling to maintain order. (Ferrell, 253-254)
In Berlin, the tension never really dissipated at the end of the war; British, French and American occupation forces had merged in the western sector, in a display of unification against the Soviet occupation forces, and there was constant needling from both sides. (Ferrell, 262-263) As well, a similar situation was already escalating in the divided province of Korea, agitated by Soviet refusal to allow a UN commission to enter the North side of the country. (Ferrell, 279)
It was during this time that it seemed everyone was forced to choose a side. Unfortunately, the sides being chosen were not always to the liking of the United States, or Russia. As mentioned, there were problems in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia with Communist advances in government. The United States, finding itself the only power financially able to deter the advance, soon became embroiled in every little incident that perceived to be led by Communists. Things worsened as one of the United States closest business partners, China turned Communist, and many of the Asian countries were appearing to lean in the same direction. This would lead to involvement in both Korea and Vietnam, for the sole purpose of halting Communist expansion.
President Eisenhower took office after Truman, and it is no surprise that former general, now President pursued a more aggressive foreign policy, with an aim towards containment of communist expansion. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as a “spokesman and lightening rod” for the President’s foreign policy initiatives, spent his time antagonizing, and provoking unfriendly factions. A more perfect person could not have been hired for the job. As Robert Schulzinger characterizes him, Secretary Dulles was a “sour-tempered, mean-spirited self-promoter,” who “savored apocalyptic statements about the future.” (Schulzinger, 232)
With a “free hand” in affairs, Secretary of State Dulles went out of his way to establish the administration’s stance against communism at home first. His chief ally in building this image was Senator Joseph McCarthy, one of the leading anti-communist activists of the time. The Secretary’s inaction against the paranoid actions and rhetoric of Senator McCarthy, were as good as consent, as the Senator went about purging governmental offices in the 1950s, and subsequent expansion of that attack to regular citizens. This worked to the advantage of the administration, in that it allowed them to focus their attention on foreign affairs, and promoting fear and suspicion of communism, on a more global scale, in an effort to advance US political ideology. (Schulzinger, 233)
Promoting fear and suspicion was done in the form of nuclear proliferation. Announcing that the US would not be bound to the use of conventional armaments, the President pursued a program to reduce conventional forces, in favor of reliance on nuclear weapons. His perception was that nuclear weapons should be used like any other weapon and the idea was to frighten the Soviet Union into accommodation, as well as any other state that ran contrary to US policy. (Schulzinger, 234) This was most evident in the President’s threats of nuclear attack to end the conflict in Korea, block communist attack of Taiwan, and to stop the rebellion that was taking place in Vietnam. Korea was the first place that things truly got out of hand. (Schulzinger, 235, 237, 238)
The Yalta accords had suggested a unification of Korea, though by the time the time the United States was ready to address the situation, local leaders had already established separate governments in the north and the south. (Schulzinger, 226)
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces successfully crossed the 38th parallel and quickly overpowered the South Korean forces. United Nations forces quickly pushed the North Korean advance back. This could have easily ended at this point, but UN forces, under the direction of General MacArthur pushed the North Koreans back past the 38th parallel, as far as the Chinese border. This alarmed the Chinese, who mobilized in support of the North Koreans, believing that the US-backed UN forces would just keep going, all the way to Beijing. Consequently, China entered the war, and pushed back, and back and forth it went for three years. (Ferrell, 280)
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US at the time, there was no military value to be had from the region. General MacArthur was determined to have a mainland war, probably with the intent of driving to Beijing, or possibly Moscow. American paranoia about Communism was just beginning to take hold, and Chinese fear of American interference in their government was at roughly the same level. (Shulzinger 227-228) (Ferrell, 280-282)
The administration was careful not to get too carried away with unilateral action though, and began to play on the fears of Europe. He introduced a plan, through NATO, to establish missile sites throughout the continent, for protection against any attempted spread of communism that might come from Russia. The plan proceeded, despite overtures by the Russian government, which sought to relax tensions with the US (Ferrell, 295) (Schulzinger, 244) Vietnam loomed on the horizon though, and quickly became another sticking point between Capitalism and Communism.
US involvement in Vietnam began immediately after World War II, in 1946. (Schulzinger, 224) The sole purpose was to aid the French in reclaiming colonial power over the state. In 1954, the US became directly involved when the French abandoned their position, and hope in Vietnam. (Ferrell, 345)
The reason for US involvement was primarily because it was perceived that the French had been “standing in the way of a Communist sweep of Asia.” (Schulzinger, 224) This policy persisted from the Truman administration through the Nixon administration, without much deviation, and known as the “domino theory”. The suggestion was that if even one part of Indochina fell to communism, the entire region would fall to communism, much like a string of dominoes. In addition, the dominoes would fall all the way to Japan, and all of Asia would be lost. The result of this domino effect, would be that a co-prosperity sphere would be created among the communist states, and the US would be frozen out of any dealings in the Pacific, and consequently unable to exert any influence in the region. (Chomsky)
Otherwise, in 1962, the Defense Department engaged “advisors” to work with the South Vietnam Army (ARVN), to root out insurgents. (Schulzinger, 269) Those “advisors” remained and grew in number until 1964, when the US was prompted to direct intervention with the Gulf of Tonkin incident. During this incident, the USS Maddox reportedly came under fire from a PT boat, and two nights later, the USS C. Turner Joy, received more mystery torpedo fire from unidentified sources. (Schulzinger, 274)
All of this was done prevent the self-determination of a people, through a nationalist non-communist movement, which had the popular support of people in the north and south of Vietnam. Essentially, the US decided that it would not allow the Vietnamese to vote, or control their own destiny, unless it was under terms dictated by the US. (Slantchev)
After being kicked out of Vietnam, by the Communists that were feared so much, the United States stayed home and licked its wounds, and focused its attention on fighting the Communist movement through escalation of an arms race that ultimately led both Russians and Americans to question the necessity of maintaining the ability to completely annihilate the world. Despite limitation treaties that were introduced, back and forth throughout the years, insignificant progress was actually made until the dissolution of the U.S.S.R in 1991. At that point, the problem shifted from identifying Communism, to identifying who was getting their old weapons. Communism was no longer a great fear, but it was quickly replaced by an equally unrealistic perceived threat from the world of Islam.
Sources:
- Schulzinger, Robert. US Diplomacy Since 1900. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: The Twentieth Century. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988.
- Legrand, Jacques. Chronicle of the 20th Century. London: Dorling Kindersley, 1995.
- Hunt, Lynn et al. The Making of the West: People and Cultures – A Concise History. 2nd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007.
- Scott, Ray. The Eastern Front: A World War One Summary. The War Times Journal http://www.richthofen.com/ww1sum2/ (accessed 23 NOV 2007)
- Smele, Jonathan. World War I: War and Revolution in Russia 1914-1921. BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/eastern_front_06.shtml (accessed 29 NOV 2007)
- The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928. U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/88736.htm (accessed 29 NOV 2007)
- The Mukden Incident of 1931 and the Stimson Doctrine. U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/88739.htm (accessed 29 NOV 2007)
- The Potsdam Conference, 1945. U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/93275.htm (accessed 01 DEC 2007)
- Chomsky, Naom. Vietnam: How Government Became Wolves. 15 Jun 1972. The New York Review of Books. http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19720615.htm (accessed 28 NOV 2007)
- Slantchev, Branislav L. National Security Strategy:The Vietnam War, 1954-1975. 03 Jun 2005. http://www.polisci.ucsd.edu/~bslantch/courses/nss/lectures/18-vietnam-war.pdf (accessed 26 NOV 2007)
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