Is there hope for Russia in the 21st Century?

Russian Empire - 1836 David Hugh Burr

Russia has endured some of the most turbulent of times, in a quest to carry out an experiment every bit as grand and idealized as that of Democracy.  Sadly, they have consistently fallen prey to overzealous leaders who are nothing more than self-serving demi-gods, seeking the ultimate in totalitarian power.  The stage is set for this rule by oppression by a series of incompetency’s and failures to recognize the need for change, at the social level.  

It begins with the son of “The Great Emancipator”, Tsar Alexander III and quickly ends with his son’s ineptitude and ineffectual leadership being completely dismantled in favor of a new social order, in a bloody and violent revolution, at a time when the rest of world is attempting to stem the tide of German expansionism.  

The revolutionaries that who seize power will start with great and mighty ideas of reforming a state and pledging allegiance to the common man.  It begins to work, but the leader of the movement is taken too soon, and the idealism that had given much hope to the Russian people, will quickly disintegrate.  

Seizing power, and assuming direction of the Communist ideal, a hostile and paranoid dictator, unrivaled even by Adolph Hitler, will ruthlessly control every aspect of the Russian world, and suppress the people nearly to the point of creating a civilization of automatons. Uncertainty and confusion will be the norm for nearly 100 years in Russia, and persists even today, with a view towards the past century. 

It is not difficult to understand why; it has only been in the last 20 years that hope for a true and free state, of the Russian people, and for the Russian people, has begun to emerge.  Can it sustain? 

Tsar Alexander Alexandrovich Romanov III (oil on canvas reproduction of a painting by Ivan Kramskoi, courtesy of WikiMedia Commons)

    

Alexander III had lived through various attempts on his father’s life.  The Tsar, Alexander II, had been the target for Nihilists and other radical groups within Russia for most of his life.  The preceding winter, there had been an explosion at the Winter Palace, coupled with the Imperial Train coming under attack. Indeed, in the final years of Alexander II, the assassination attempts became more and more numerous, despite being hailed as the Great Emancipator, for his abolition of serfdom in Russia.  

On Sunday, March 13, 1881, the Nihilists were finally successful, and Alexander III could only watch on as his dismembered and disfigured father was brought home to the Winter Palace to die. (Lowe, 37)  Ironically, it had only been a few hours since Alexander II had signed a decree giving the people the right to begin to assemble parliamentary representation.  Sent to be put in type that morning, it was ultimately withheld, for further consideration by the new Tsar. (Lowe, 56)

As heir-apparent, Alexander III had been known to back many of the liberal reforms that his father had instituted.  However, with the brutal death of his father, many remained uncertain.  While his father lay dead, Alexander began to be harassed by the Russian press, advocating the granting of a Constitution.  Seemingly, this did not bother Alexander so much as the ultimatum he received from the Nihilists that had murdered his father.  Their statement essentially demanded a dismantling of the current regime, or face revolution.  This ultimatum was likely the determining factor for how Alexander was to proceed in as Tsar, and on the advice of his ministers, decided to rescind the decree, until there could be further consultation on the matter. (Lowe, 55-8)

Instead of granting representation to the people, Alexander decided to experiment a little, and assemble the current municipal councils and Zemstvos to consider the smaller questions concerning peasants in Russia.  One of their first orders was to consider the question of taprooms, by which the new Congress would get its sarcastic nickname, The Tap-Room Congress.  The deliberations of these meetings were not kept secret or supervised by any official from the government, and were reported freely in the press.  Unfortunately, while this satisfied the Tsar’s curiosity of Parliamentary process, it was source of amusement for the rest of the common people of Russia; it had no power, and was obviously at odds with Alexander’s goals. (Lowe, 59)  This was the closest that the people get to the Constitution and Assembly, for many years.   With nowhere else to turn, Alexander was forced to rely on the wisdom of his old teacher, Konstantine Pobedonostseff.  Convincing Alexander was not much of a problem.  He buttered him up well, and convinced him to return to the days of his grandfather, Tsar Nicholas.  He impressed upon him, and he on the people that “God was God, and the Tsar was His prophet.” (Lowe, 64)

Alexander III seemed to continue to follow the ultra-conservative advice of Konstantine Pobedonostev, moderating it with his own personal beliefs, fully aware of his role in shaping the emerging state.  He did nullify many of the reforms of his father.  He abolished many of the courts and transferred their functions to judges appointed by the Interior Ministry, who appointed “Land Captains, usually hereditary noblemen… to supervise peasant affairs,” and who could discard decisions made by town assemblies and other peasant level courts.    He reduced the city electorates, creating tension between the local peasant representation and the reigning governmental bodies, though they continued to achieve minor advances in personal freedom.  (MacKenzie, 26)

Alexander III was considered by many sources to be brutish, unsophisticated, and horribly repressive.  However, despite the tendency towards regression and repression in many of his policies towards the people, he was still highly favored.  His coronation was lavish, and the celebration extended to the general population, even to the poorest of subjects.  (Lowe, 76)  His tendency towards pacificism in foreign policy (Lowe, 79) earned him the nickname “The Peacekeeper,” allowed him to begin major internal projects, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway in East Asia, which would bring about quick economic advances.  He also strongly encouraged the growth in the arts, desiring and recognizing the need for Russia to make its own name in this area. (RAO)  It is likely that Tsar Alexander understood that this would usher in a new era of unprecedented intellectual awareness in Russia, but he probably would not grasp the final impact of the advances that literature would have on the destiny of the Romanov family and monarchy.  It was during this time that a young Vladimir Ulyanov, would become attached to and make a life long ambition of, realizing the Prussian social theories advanced by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, called communism. Changing his last name to Lenin, he was educated in this new period of intellectual enlightenment. Indeed, it could be said that Tsar Alexander III indirectly brought about the downfall of his successor and son, Nicholas II.  

 Tsar Nikolay Alexandrovich Romanov II - photo by A.A. Pasetti, courtesy of WikiMedia Commons)

As the last Tsar to reign over Russia, Nicholas II ascended to his reign wholly unprepared.  His father, Alexander III died unexpectedly at the age of 49.  Though having quieted the empire, and built up the respect of other nations, Alexander III had mostly pursued a reactionary policy that was not built to last.  This was especially true, considering the education of Nicholas II, which had been in way geared more towards the old world aristocratic methods of ruling.  Coupled with his indecisiveness, and weak resolution, he stood in stark contrast to his father.  In addition, his instructor General Danilovitch, was anything but equal to the charge of raising a successor, being rather narrow minded and suspicion.  It is reported that he was constantly reminding young Nicholas that he must always remember, “that everybody who approaches wishes to obtain something from you.” (Schelking, 104)  This had its natural consequences, and Nicholas become equally as suspicious of everyone and everything.  Nicholas was also rather non-confrontational.  He would often praise his ministers, only to send them a telegram at home, dismissing their services. (Schelking, 104)   It was in this manner that Nicholas II guided Russia out of his father’s world and into the land of confusion, dishonor, and ultimately revolution.

Overall, the populous had been hoping that Nicholas II would continue the work that his grandfather, Alexander II, had begun.  Instead, he seemed to have made up his mind that his father’s reactionary way of dealing with things was the best course.  He even declared as much, saying that he wished to “leave the country to [his] son, even as [he] received it from [his] father” and began surrounding himself with many of the same reactionary ministry that had surrounded his father’s administration.    The exception to this rule was Count Sergei Witte, who had helped to further many of the financial and industrial gains of Russia.  Unfortunately, the Count would continue to be pre-occupied with financial reforms and would ignore anything regarding internal administration of the state.  This would prove to work against the new ruler quicker and more efficiently than most would imagine, as general discontent was on the rise, in recognition of Nicholas ineptitude.  (Schelking, 251)

While revolution had been on the mouths of the peasants since the time Nicholas’ grandfather, it reached new heights during his rule and ultimately led to his downfall.  It almost seemed to waiting and ripening on the vine, waiting for the perfect opportunity.   The opportunity would seek its own way, following a dispute over the Manchuria-Korea border between Russia and Japan.  On of the occasions when Count Witte had offered his advice on this situation, it was ignored.  Instead, Nicholas followed the poor advice of his Interior Minister V. K. Pleve who perceived that a war with Japan would be an excellent means of distracting the revolutionaries in the state towards goals more suited to the state.  Consequently, despite repeated offers from the Japanese to compromise, he stumbled and blundered his way into an unnecessary war, which would have disastrous consequences.  (MacKenzie, 33)

The Russo-Japanese War turned out to be a fiasco, and horribly damaging to any confidence that the people might have felt towards this awkward ruler.  Taking heavy losses against the Japanese, the Russians were doing all that they could to contain them, as well as their own militaries honor and pride, but nothing seemed to be working.  Moral among all Russians was at an all time low.  There had been several years of bad harvests, and the more educated and articulate populous that had been fostered by Alexander III, demanded a more decisive and responsive government. (MacKenzie, 54)

Nicholas had made a few concessions to the public, but the hugely bureaucratic network of his government, made most of these conciliatory efforts seem like nonsense, and completely short of the public’s expectations of what they perceived needed to be done.    Unfortunately, the seeds of revolt had already been planted, and mimicking the days of pre-revolutionary France, there were political banquets being held everywhere.  The time was drawing near for Russians to take their destiny out of the hands of rulers that were only concerned for themselves and their image, and take the reins themselves.  The only thing that was needed was a spark.

On January 9, 1905, Father George Gapon organized some factory workers in St. Petersburg, as a means of distracting them from revolutionary extremism.  Urging his followers, through peaceful means, to petition the Tsar to the end the war, he led them towards the Winter Palace.  They were unarmed, singing hymns, and obviously had no intention of initiating violence.  Unfortunately, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich did not perceive it that way, and after the protesters refused to halt on his orders, he commanded that his troops fire on the crowd, slaughtering hundreds.  (MacKenzie, 55)  This one action united the Russian people against the monarchy, more than any other, and they rallied in support of their comrades who had fallen on this “Bloody Sunday” and a general strike was soon proclaimed in Petrograd and chaos ensued.  Railway transportation was paralyzed, and water, food, and fuel were virtually non-existent.  

Nicholas II quickly sought a way out of the mess in Manchuria, so he could turn his attention on his quickly disintegrating control.  First, he seized on request of the United States President Roosevelt, to mediate a quick end to the war.    The end would not come quick enough though, and the revolutionaries were gaining support, and organizing quickly; in addition, naval mutinies erupted, and armed revolutionary movements were taking shape. (MacKenzie, 55)  It seemed that there was nothing, which Nicholas II could do to change the course.  He attempted to establish the Duma, as a form of representative assembly for the people, though many would boycott it and renounce it as not nearly enough, and mass discontent continued to rise.  Another general strike appeared in September, and “nearly out of his mind with fear,” (Schelking, 252) Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto.  The declaration “promised a constitution, civil liberties, and a national parliament (Duma) elected by a broad suffrage without whose consent no bill was to become law.” (MacKenize, 56)  

For the most part, through all of the chaos of this time, the moves of Nicholas II seemed to push back the tide for just a little while.  While it was not particularly pleasing to all elements, it did satisfy the more middle-of-the-road folks, isolated the radicals, and thrust a wedge between those that advocated social change over political change.  This wedge would remain throughout the remainder of the reign of Nicholas II and well into 20th century USSR.  Helping it along too, was that most of the leaders of the initial revolt were in exile, and unable to command as they would in the coming years.  (MacKenzie, 57)

On May 10, 1906, the Tsar opened the first Duma, which would end in nothing more than confusion.  He gave no the Duma no directives, while at the same time fairly well ignoring any measures they presented.  He undermined their attempts at authority at every turn, holding secret sessions with some of their leaders, and when the Duma turned to the public for support of their efforts, he dissolved the body and prohibited future elections.   The Kadet party, a large part of the Duma, though initially in defiance of the Tsar, would soon become suspicious of the people that they represented, and turn towards the idea of constitutional monarchy.  This would lead to their being perceived by most peasants as “bourgeois,” and a party dedicated to preserving the aristocratic class.  (MacKenzie, 61)

There was nothing that Nicholas II, which would make things better.  Every attempt was met with opposition.  Arising from the morass was Pyotr Stolypin, a well-off landowner, and provincial marshall, and the new Prime Minister, who some contend stole power through a coup.

Pyotr Stolypin, was a model Stalinist, before Josef Stalin.  He was a repressive and ruthless leader, and perceived these means to be the only way to reform.  He frequently made use of Article 87, which gave executives (such as him) the means to rule by decree, and would ultimately proclaim a state of emergency.  During this “state of emergency”, he organized the Black-Hundred, to terrorize the countryside with brutal reprisals and cruel punishments on the peasants for infractions, kill hundreds of state and local officials, as well as any perceived to be of the revolutionary ilk that might topple the middle classes.  Discontent continued to spread under his direction, in all levels of society, and ultimately lead to his assassination in 1911 by a member of the police. (Lenin-1)

The death of Pyotr Stolypin seemed to cause further confusion in the general populous, and much more in the monarchy, but ultimately revolutionary factions would recognize the power vacuum he had left, and begin to make their push to fill it.  The leader of the Bolshevik movement, Vladimir Lenin put it plainly, that the people should have learned a valuable lesson through all of this, “either march to freedom by overthrowing the tsarist monarchy… or sink deeper into slavery.”  (Lenin-1)

It was hard to motivate the masses though.  With all of the constant arguing between factions, the public seemed to be more and more indifferent, and appeared to be willing to back whoever was going to provide them with stability.  Indeed, they were characterized by one citizen, Mr. Kondurushkin, who complained, “Russian society seems to me as yielding as rubber, or dough. It can be kneaded and pressed by word or dead.  But as soon as it is alone, it resumes its shape as of old.”  Essentially, he seemed to be saying that while they realized the necessity of the state, they would essentially do nothing unless someone or some movement compelled them to. (Zvezda-1)  As well, with the world quickly tumbling towards war, there seemed to be chaos on all fronts, and no firm leadership to guide the people out of the darks they had been in since the ascension of Nicholas II.

While things were stewing, on June 28, 1914, a Bosnian student attached to the Serbian National Movement assassinated the heir to the Austrian throne, and a complex network of alliances and secret treaties tumbled all of Europe, as well as Russia towards brutal conflict.  At first, Russia was indifferent, and the Tsar called for partial mobilization of Russian troops.  At the urging of his ministers, whom this writer believes probably filled, him with the same crazy ideals about stemming the revolution at home with war abroad again, Nicholas II ordered full mobilization.  Indeed, it is likely that he was so fed up with the constant strife and conflict within his own state, that he made the decision to depart, and lead the army in the struggle.  This was to be his final and fatal decision.  In the end, he would lose not only his state, but also his life, and the lives of his immediate family, through violent revolution. (MacKenzie, 89)

While Nicholas II was at the front in March of 1917, a spontaneous revolution broke out in Petrograd again.  This time, even though there were specific orders in place to handle such an uprising, the mounted police were not as interested in keeping the peace, as Nicholas would have wanted them to.  Ultimately, after firing on the crowd, and having another regiment return fire on them, they gave up and returned to their barracks, having likely decided that it was not worth it, and resolving to not fire again on strikers.  The government had just lost the support of the military, and as is typical in these situations, confidence was never restored.  

The Petrograd Soviet was established, and though they remained divided, they had enough cohesion to convince most of the garrison at Petrograd to defect to their side, assist in gathering and arresting all of the ministers.  Upon hearing of the uprising, Nicholas II attempted to return to his family, but was stopped and forced to return to the front.  In a last ditch effort to save his crumbling authority, he agreed to establish a more responsible ministry.  Unfortunately, it was not enough for the commanders he was dealing with, who unanimously demanded abdication.  Hoping to save himself, Nicholas II abdicated to his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail.  Mikhail realizing he was in a difficult position that he could not hope to win, immediately renounced his claims, and the rule of the Romanov’s ended. (MacKenzie, 98)

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin - photo by L Leonidov, courtesy of WikiMedia Commons

With no defined leadership in Russia, and the people of the state involved in a war that nobody really wanted, and they knew they were wholly unprepared to fight, the various factions immediately began a grab for power.  While many of the arguing factions were still horribly divided, none was as opportunistic and ready for violent accession, as the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin.

At first, there was an attempt to retain order through the concept of dual power, offered by Leon Trotskii, Lenin’s closest advisor, later head of the opposition group known as the Mensheviks.  The concept was that there would be a weaker interim government, made up of those that were financially, and intellectually capable of handling things, though not necessarily powerful enough to.   Essentially, they (the bourgeoisie) would be allowed to hold temporary power, as they pretty much always had, with the understanding that their way of doing things had outlived its usefulness in society.   This Provisional government worked well to maintain stability for a relatively short while, but the Bolsheviks, with Josef Stalin at the head, in Vladimir Lenin’s absence, insisted on having full power, and as quickly as possible.  Fortunately, Lenin was to return to Russia in April.  (MacKenzie, 107)

Vladimir Lenin’s return provided very little stability to the government though, and as he declared that the bourgeois should be purged, and that “the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry” should be in full power, confused reigned the day.  (MacKenzie, 108)  Shifting from left to right, the populous seemed to be gathering behind those opposing Bolshevik rule.  The overall condition of Russia spiraled downward.  The interim government chose to continue the war with Germany, despite the protests of the masses.  The Bolsheviks tried, but failed to win majority in the elections, and conflict between every individual and entity was the norm.  As internal strife continued between the various factions, the Bolsheviks rallied the support of the masses, primarily through propaganda and exploitation, and seized power in a relatively unopposed coup in November 1917.  Though the moderates protested that the action was illegal, their voices were ignored.  Vladimir Lenin established himself as the President of the Council of People’s Commissars, and urged immediate peace to all nations involved in the war, and end to the secret diplomacy that had created the war.  (MacKenzie, 117)

In addition, he moved quickly in the domestic sector, knowing that he did not have a lot of time, or there would be greater potential for more revolt if someone did not assume complete and decisive command of the people.  From Petrograd, that November, he sat down and began issuing many statements to the people about the ambitions and goals of the new government, in the hopes of assuring them of the stability to come.  In one letter to the peasants, he states that it should be “known that all power in the country henceforth belongs wholly to the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies… landed proprietorship has been abolished… the former property of the landowners… is the property of the whole people, and which the people themselves must therefore protect.”  (Izvestia)  It seems that he was acutely aware that the peasants needed something to rally around, primarily themselves, to deflect them away from antagonizing the new government.

By 1918, Vladimir Lenin had made peace with Germany, through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, viewing it as essential to the new regime’s survival.  Unfortunately, a bigger task was soon at hand, political opposition was furious, and civil war broke out between the factions, known as the “Reds” and the “Whites.”  The allies soon began interfering on the side of the Whites.  Vladimir Lenin was forced to begin to pursue oppressive action against perceived threats, to stem the tide.  Seemingly, it worked rather well, and in the end, the Reds were victorious, though a deep resentment remained over the support provided by the allies to their opposition.   One of the oppressive programs instituted was War Communism, which was an emergency program designed to build nationalization, mobilize the labor force, and make grain requisitioning easier.  This experiment would ultimately lead to disaster with many of populous starving, and industry falling apart.  It would take another revolt in Kronstadt to bring V. Lenin to the realization that it was doing more harm than good.  In this revolt, excessive force was used to put down the uprising, primarily out of fear that it might kick off other similar revolts.  After putting the down the revolt with a massive infantry assault, V. Lenin would finally acquiesce to peasant demands, and scrape the program of War Communism, stating that Kronstadt “lit up reality better than anything else”.  It indicated the need for a different direction for the economy and the state. (MacKenzie, 132)

Increasing paranoia towards opposition would fuel many of the directives of the Bolshevik bureaucracy from this point forward.  While V. Lenin was a man willing to listen to opposing views, he was becoming increasingly aware that it was not going to help his cause.  He would go on to authorize a secret police to observe and report to him, and completely ban factions within the party.  While criticized by many as being hard-liner, these steps were undoubtedly necessary for him, and the Bolshevik Party to retain control.  Unfortunately, many of the institutions he created for protection would end up being nothing more than tools for oppression by his successor.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

When Vladimir Lenin died from a stroke in 1924, he had named no successor, likely because he felt that there was nobody that could adequately carry on the work he had started, and he probably did not expect his life to end so quickly.  There was an intense power struggle, but ultimately one man would rise to the top, Josef Stalin, a Georgian of serf descent.  One would think that his humble origins would compel him to be more sensitive to the needs of the common man, but this was not to be the case at all.  Unfortunately, life circumstances built a wholly different individual.  A drunken father and a strict disciplinary upbringing through the Tiflis Orthodox Seminary created a person that was more inclined to question authority, than bow to it.  In addition, while in exile, he was to become acquainted with a book that expounds upon the virtues of totalitarianism, Machiavelli’s “The Prince.” (MacKenzie, 140)  It is almost without question that this book would be the cornerstone of his ruling ideology.  Indeed, as Machiavelli is well-noted as stating in the book, “a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only.” (Machiavelli, 88)  Josef Stalin seemed to rule by these words, and many of the others throughout the book.

Machiavelli was not Josef Stalin’s only inspiration.  Vladimir Lenin had somehow become his unquestionable idol, likely in his quest for ultimate power, and Lenin’s astute manner of persuasion.  Regardless, Josef Stalin idolized Vladimir Lenin, and upon establishing himself as his successor, used V. Lenin’s ideology as the reasoning for all of his actions.  Borrowing from Marxist-Lenin idea, he developed his own theory on socialism, that “Russia will... blaze the trail to socialism,” and proceeded to ensure that this would happen, one way or another.

Josef Stalin likely ruled with the best of intentions, based on Machiavelli’s principles, building a huge personality cult, and oppressing where necessary.  He probably saw this in Vladimir Lenin, as well.  Unfortunately, where V. Lenin was open to debate on issues, and formed his decisions around the debate, only oppressing those who questioned his final authority, Josef Stalin oppressed any differentiating opinion on any level, all as he would suggest, in the full interest of the state and the party. (MacKenzie, 150)

Indeed, as dissent against his rule arose, he ruthlessly crushed it, when peasants demanded concessions to ease their life; he urged action against them and any sympathizers.  He began what is known as The Great Purge, effectively wiping out all of his opposition, as well as anyone that he perceived to be a potential threat to his rule.  (MacKenize, 152) Essentially, he became everything that epitomizes a dictator or totalitarian ruler, and ultimately the world would brand his manner of ruling the state with its own unique descriptor, Stalinism.  He was not all bad though, the manner in which he pursued success, pushed an otherwise indifferent populous to attempt to make a difference, again under the threat of retaliation.  His plan of Forced Collectivization turned out to be an utter failure, ultimately provoking resistance, which in turn brought suffering to those involved, through persecution.  (BBC-1)

Through all of the trails and tribulations, Josef Stalin still managed to create a god-like air, completely in line with the principles previously mentioned.  Indeed, Nicolo Machiaveli would likely have been very proud of Josef Stalin and the cult of personality he had established and the devotion granted to him, in spite of all of his evil deeds.  Even as his power became more absolute, he never relaxed his grip.  He was the final authority in all matters.  If he stated a decision, it was the final decision.  Opposition to his means was consistently dealt with by death, or in minor cases, exile. 

Josef Stalin only stumbled in his decisiveness once.  After having reached agreement, through the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1941, as tension built with Japan, he seemed assured that any aggression would be delayed on the western borders of the state.  Unfortunately, Adolph Hitler was just as untrustworthy as Josef Stalin was, and Nazi Germany soon invaded without cause or warning.  In the opinion of this writer, this seemed to cause a bit of a breakdown, as Josef Stalin disappeared into hiding, and could not be reached to guide his state against them.  After a few days, he surfaced, rallied the troops and before any of the allies could manage to provide assistance, managed to push the Nazis back. (MacKenize, 230)

The events of World War II became a source of contention between Russia and the West.  Promises were broken on both sides, suspicion and fear ruled the day, and perpetuated itself through action and inaction on both sides.  Ultimately, this would lead to a period of attempted expansion through isolation, as Josef Stalin gathered the states around his borders under the flag of communism, to insolate and protect the state.  In the years following World War II, through the end of J. Stalin’s dictatorship and life, he would dash the hopes of many for a more liberal government, in favor of restoring absolute control, and pushing for more rapid industrialization.  (MacKenzie, 236)

The populous did not have long to wait for the much hoped for change.  In 1953, Josef Stalin finally died, ending more than 25 years of personal rule and ruthlessness that has yet to be matched anywhere in the world.  At the same time, he had left behind one of the two most powerful states in the world, rivaled only by the United States.  Unfortunately, the manner in which he had established himself, and maintained that power, left no means for selecting or implanting a replacement, and Russia seemed destined to spiral out of control, like so many other dictatorships throughout the world’s history.  (MacKenize, 241)

Despite the world’s fears of a downward spiral, Josef Stalin had unintentionally, or perhaps intentionally, left one individual suited to the task.  Having groomed Nikita Krushchev to follow his path, this person immediately organized and followed a similarly ruthless path against the opposition, and quickly assumed power.  Through bullying, and finally threats of exposure of the evil deeds of Josef Stalin, and partially carrying out the later, Nikita Krushchev seized the opportunity to implant himself as leader of the Communist Party, and all of Russia.  However, having been witness to many of the atrocities carried out under Josef Stalin, Nikita Krushchev finally delivered some moderation to the people of Russia.  Indeed, he followed more closely the principles set down by Vladimir Lenin, emphasizing persuasion of the masses, rather than strong-arm coercion.   Party Congresses, which had been anything but frequent under Josef Stalin, now became regular, meeting more often in a year sometimes, than they had in 5 years.  (MacKenize, 253)

Nikita Khrushchev’s reign was marked by numerous mistakes, but could be viewed as a continuation of an experiment that had begun before the rise of Stalin.  His support of reforms made a lasting impact on many of the satellite countries surrounding Russia, and induced independence movements among many of them.  The people were definitely feeling a new freedom that they had not felt.  Unfortunately, it was this very thing that alienated most of his constituents, and conservatives in the party following the lead of Leonid Brezhnev eventually led to him being removed from office.  Surprisingly, he was not utterly destroyed though, or sent into exile, merely retirement in rural Russia.  It seems that his liberal mindedness had affected not just the population, but had softened many of the hard-liners in the party as well.  (CNN)

Leonid Brezhnev came to power, and though a hard-liner with Stalinist tendencies, he had been brought up in the ranks by the person he had succeeded.  This served to create a leader that was a bit more middle of the road.  His internal dealings with the populous were not quite as moderate as Nikita Krushchev, (MacKenzie, 275) but the people of Russia did enjoy a new level of living through all of this, higher than any had seen in years past.

However, persecution of ethnic groups and dissenters rose sharply, primarily in the interest of suppressing “bourgeois nationalism.”  This did not sit well with a populous that was still feeling the effects of N. Khrushchev’s liberal reforms, and dissent and revolt became commonplace in many of the satellite states.  Many did manage to break away, but not without fierce, almost excessive Russian intervention, which became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, similar to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. Repression of uprisings through intervention, in the case of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia, dashed the hopes of many of progressive reforms, and his insistence on furthering a more formidable military-industrial base in direct confrontation and opposition to its competitor, the United States.  Unfortunately, this pursuit would impoverish the entire Soviet economy so far that he would be later criticized as having caused a horrible decrease in overall living standards and perpetuation of corruption of the Party.  (Kreis)

Despite a higher standard of living, stagnation was definitely on the rise.  During all of this time, the Communist Party had been in power for a very long time.  Many of them had never been anything but the party, and were aging considerably.  At 60 years old, he was as many of the older generation are, staunchly opposed to any sort of change that might disrupt his personal stability.  Indeed, the entire Communist Party of this time could be characterized in much the same way, until the last of the old men died off.

Once Leonid Brezhnev passed away, former KGB head Yuri Andropov assumed power, but his age and health were not in his favor.  Despite fears of a return to Stalinism, “tightening discipline for Russians… and ignoring the needs of the human spirit” (Burns), he actually managed to surprise everyone with moves towards a more progressive government.  Unfortunately, it was not too last.  Yuri Andropov only lasted a couple of years before succumbing to poor health, and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko, another aged Party diplomat, with strong ties to Leonid Brezhnev.  The world joined the people of Russia in wondering once again, what next.  Konstantin Chernenko was in no health to run the state, and actually assumed the role against his doctor’s advice.  He was the last of the aging bureaucratic machine, and his limited one-year term, he left very little impression on the world, much less the Russian people.  (Soviet-Empire)

 

Commonwealth of Independent States

What followed next had been a long time coming, and would change the face of Russia.  Succeeding K. Chernenko, Mikhail Gorbachev was not necessarily a liberal, but was definitely a progressive in every sense of the word, and his public, and the world, would hail him as the greatest thing to happen to Russia since the revolution.  He pushed for massive reforms, in the hopes of creating a more efficient system that persist in a more democratic way.  Recognizing that the arms race had nearly ruined the Russian economy, he moved to shift more and more resources to the citizens, and ultimately to dismantle the arms race between Russia and the United States completely.  The changes he implemented, and pushed hard for unsettled many in the party though, and he lost site of the what sort of disruption the reforms were causing, either that or he simply did not care.  It is likely that he believed as many of his predecessors had the faster push thing through, the more permanent they become.  So massive were the reforms, and far-reaching, that he became the first Russian leader to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, having been attributed with ending the Cold War.  Regardless, his reforms infuriated many of the hard-liners, and in August 1991 while he was on vacation, they attempted a coup.  It failed miserably though, because of Mikhail intense popularity.  Moscow neared revolution again. (Mikhail)

Mikhail Gorbachev was hard pressed to resume power for much longer, especially with the kind of change he had in mind after the attempted coup.  The Communist Party was dissolved; the Baltic states who had been clamoring for independence since World War II were allowed to succeed, and he pushed forward with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, removing the Communists from any further power.  The end had come for Communism and Democracy was moving full steam ahead.  Mikhail Gorbachev had moved the state out of the dark ages, and on Christmas Day 1991, he resigned as president, replaced by Boris Yelstein, in the first truly democratic elections held in Russia. (Kreis-2)

Russia was still in a bit of a crisis though, and Boris Yelstein needed to move quickly, or he would lose control completely.  He did exactly that, and pushed harder and faster than his predecessor, instituting change at furious rate.  It seems that he knew what M. Gorbachev had realized, that despite everything, the USSR had fallen behind the rest of the world on all points, especially politically, and if they were to retain their position as a world power, they would need to get in line with the way the rest of the world was collectively operating.  (Kreis-3)

Overall, in the end, the changes had come too fast and furious for the old hard-liner communists, and there was very little that they could do once western views, ideas and technology began to stream into the state.  They were extremely hard-pressed to convince anyone, especially the populous that theirs was a better alternative.  It is highly unlikely that the Communist Party will ever enjoy the freedom of movement that they had throughout the 20th century.  Their oppression, repression, and totalitarian rule will never be accepted on such a grand scale again.  On the other hand, perhaps Vladimir Lenin was right saying that the Russian will become lazy, and in doing so allow the evil to seep back in.  There is already concern of this by many in the western world, when it comes to former KGB agent, and current two-term President Vladimir Putin.  There is concern that he will establish himself as Prime Minister and rather than allow free elections, will install a successor that he can manipulate.  Indeed, he has already barred his staunchest critic, Mikhail Kasyanov from running as an opposition candidate to President Putin’s handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev.  With an expected turnout of as much as 70% of the population, it will certainly be an election worth watching in the week left before this widely scrutinized election. (BBC-2) Will the hard-line return, or will Prime Minister Putin watch and direct from the background to ensure that the democratic process that he has helped to foster, remains in place?  I suppose that only time will tell, but the energy and the determination of the Russian people will prevail, regardless of the outcome.  They have emerged from the darkest of ages, and will likely catapult themselves to a status much greater than their old rival, the United States, and finally achieve the greatness they aspired to for so long.

References:

1. Lowe, Charles.  Alexander III. New York: MacMillan and Co., 1895.
2. MacKenzie, Davd. and Curran, Michael W.  Russia and the USSR in the Twentieth Centruy.  4th ed.  Belmont:  Wadsworth, 2002.
3. “A Romanov Album:  Family History” (RAO). Russian Archives Online. http://www.abamedia.com/rao/gallery/romanoff/hist.html. (accessed 23 Feb 2008)
4. de Schelking, Eugene.  Recollections of a Russian Diplomat:  The Suicide of Monarchies (William II and Nicholas II).  New York:  The Macmillan Company, 1918.
5. Lenin, Vladimir I.  Stolypin and the Revolution.  Sotsial-Demokrat, No 24, October 31, 1911.
6. “Notes of a Newspaer Reader.” Zvezda, No. 28.  Nov. 5, 1911.
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12. Burns, John M.  The Emergence of Yuri Andropov.  The New York Times.  Nov. 6, 1983.  http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990DEED6133BF935A35752C1A965948260 (accessed 24 Feb 2008)
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16. Kreis, Steven.  “The Walls Came Tumbling Down” The History Guide: Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe. 2001.  http://www.historyguide.org/europe/lecture16.html   (accessed 24 Feb 2008)
17. “The Putin Project”.  BBC World Serivce. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1112_putin_project/index.shtml . (accessed 24 Feb 2008)
18. WikiMedia Commons. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (accessed 24 Feb 2008)

HI319 - Russia in the 20th Century