Abstract
The American way of war is a constantly evolving situation, whose roots reach back to before the formation of the state itself. Throughout the time preceding the world wars, military helped to forge a policy that aided unprecedented economic growth; however, the state of this policy has become inflexible in current years, standing in stark contrast to the adaptability of its military forces.
Introduction
The United States perception of war, through its policy, attitude, and commitment to waging war, superficially seems primarily related to the immediate conditions surrounding any particular conflict. Although immediate needs for defense, or preventative action, are often the tipping point for United States entry into armed campaigns, the underlying compulsion is typically much more intricate. Historical contexts, social attitudes, international relations, foreign and domestic policy, technology, and cultural presumptiveness have all played a pivotal role in shaping the perception of the necessity for war by the government, and the people, of the United States. These factors have become so ingrained within the culture of the United States that it has produced a long-standing, contradictory relationship with war itself. While those in the United States fully comprehend the need to protect their national interests, or defend national borders, there is an inherent aversion to contributing to and supporting efforts, to the same end. This near contempt for the implements of war, partially related to the obvious, distasteful aspects and consequences of war itself, and partially to the level of trust in government, appears as a reflection of the collective experiences that formed, and continue to form, the perception of war in the United States.
Formation of Power
Europeans inhabiting the North American continent, prior to the United States Revolution, maintained defensive military habits, only fighting when necessary to fight, to preserve self and property. Colonists had no interest in warring against those already inhabiting the area, only keeping them a safe distance. However, and consequently, as an increasingly unwelcome guest, colonists found that defense against the native population, was of utmost importance, as distasteful as it was to what was initially, primarily, a puritanical population. All capable men aided in protection and defense because personal interests were at stake, and those ruling the colonies did not perceive a need for a standing army anywhere but in the civilized world, or to protect interests in transit to the less civilized Americas.
As the population in the colonies grew, various European interests began to infringe upon each other, and the scope of protection required expanded. Personal interests conceded to regional interests, and those ruling the colonies began to place requirements on individuals to aid in the protection of those interests. Male colonists expected to maintain their own arms, and present themselves at regular role calls, provided the ruling class with a sense of military strength, should the need arise to defend against large-scale confrontations. Fines imposed on those failing to meet their obligations undoubtedly led to some discontent with impressments to military service; however, societal expectations, and ensuing criticism of personal honor likely held more weight with any decision to acquiesce. (Millet, 3, 5)
Forced implication in defending regional interests, combined with an unwillingness of the ruling powers to provide for the protection and defense of colonial interests proved to work against the ruling powers. Unwilling, and often times incapable of providing for adequate defense of colonial interests, local militias evolved, which contributed to a growing sense of self-reliance. Indeed, nearly 50 years after the American Revolution John Adams wrote “…it was the actions of British ministers which made independence first a possibility and then a likelihood.” (Cogliano) The revolution sought to break the bonds of an ineffective governing body, in the interests of providing for the self-determination of the people of the North American continent, and the colonists took up arms against the primary ruling power, perceiving a necessity for self-preservation.
The standing British Army, sent to squash the rebellion in the Americas, only served to legitimize the colonists perception of the necessity of pursuing their own destiny, in their own way. The British military forcefully quartered regulars in private homes, provided scant protection to and constantly harassed the civilian population, often impressed unwilling men in to service, and generally brought a lower degree of morality with them. (Millet, 52-55) All of these actions combined made such a profound impact on the founders of the United States, as to affect domestic military policy and decisions through current times, emphasized specifically in the third, fourth, and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution. (US Constitution)
Post-Revolutionary War military ideology, and perception of the use of force by imperial governments of the time, seemed to prove to policy makers that a standing army would lead to the pursuit of similar goals in the new state, leaving the door open to military despotism. Subsequent conflicts with the Native American population, as well as renewed conflict with Britain, emphasized the necessity to protect the populace and associated interests, at minimum, overwhelming protests against maintaining a modest military. (Millet, 102) The government and populace quickly realized that the average citizen was too poorly equipped to deal with international conflict; not to mention, an armed force, not specifically trained and outfitted for such situations, are of very little defense. During this time, state militias formed and persisted to meet immediate security needs, but often disbanded, after meeting their objectives, leading to an often poorly equipped and ill-prepared military. Some suggest that this point in itself has also led to a military complex that, while well-trained and versed in the finer art of battle, and able to overcome any odds, is unable to adequately guide policy prior to war, to prevent the same, much less establish clear goals in post-war restructuring. (Echevarria)
The Civil War brought renewed strength to the argument for a standing army, for the common defense of the state, its populace, and their combined interests. However, technological advances, which provided for a more efficient means of battlefield slaughter, repulsed many with massive casualties, associated with a seeming indifference of the government to the same, and brought credence to previous suggestions of military despotism. (Millet, 102) The extent of death, accompanied by the length, proximity, and questionable induction practices of the war, dampened arguments for a continuation of military strength, by the time it finally concluded. Post-war reconstruction, along with continuing expansion in to western territories, provided the military with an opportunity to present a case to persist though, in a reduced capacity, for no other purpose than domestic policy enforcement, and disaster recovery.
Establishing Dominance
Military strength continued to grow quietly after the Civil War, borne primarily out of the previously mentioned necessities, as well as increasing involvement in global commerce. In spite of attempted reductions in military strength, as interests expanded around the global marketplace, the military continued steady growth out of a perceived necessity to protect interests abroad, against both perceived and real threats. Confrontation with Spain, in the years immediately following the Civil War, led to colonial acquisitions that most Americans had argued against repeatedly, while instilling a greater sense of urgency to protect and defend these possessions from other greater powers that might interfere with the forward march of American economic growth. (Pfaff)
Similar to the pre-World War superpower of its parent, Britain, all of the wars since the economic coming of age of the United States, find justification of military campaigns in economic protectionism. The United States entered World War I, primarily because its economic interests had come under extensive threat from German U-boat operations in the North Atlantic; in World War II, the threat of Japanese and Nazi imperialism to American economic and political interests, were the driving forces in the necessity for entanglement to support the allied powers of Europe. Korea and Vietnam portrayed as necessary to spread the advance of Communism, when studied closely can be tied to American concern over the ability of retaining continuing influence over foreign markets. Indeed, recent American military efforts in Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan bear the same trappings; however, that is not to say that Americans do not perceive these actions as justified. (Record)
Conclusion
The ability of the nation to sustain development, through continuing economic prosperity, is a direct and immediate threat to the American way of life, something that Americans have fought for since before birth of their nation. While Americans are not comfortable sending people to die in a foreign land, for an abstract cause, they are even more uncomfortable with the idea of scaling back their enthusiasm for the growth and expansion of democratic ideals and capitalist principles. Consequently, Americans perceive that peaceful existence is not possible without war, or the means to make war, for no other reason than to preserve, protect, and defend the peace; this is the prevailing American attitude towards war and peace, which continues to present day.
References:
- Millett, Allan R. Millett and Maslowski, Peter. (2006) For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. Revised and Expanded. New York: Free Press.
- Cogliano, Francis D. (2001) Was the American Revolution Inevitable? BBC Broadcasting Company. Retrieved September 20, 2009, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/american_revolution_01.shtml
- Amendments of the The United States Constitution. (1797) US Constitution Online. Retreived September 20, 2009, from http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html
- Echevarria, Antulio J II. An American Way of War or Way of Battle? Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. (2004). Retrieved September 18, 2009, from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub662.pdf
- Pfaff, William. The Question of Hegemony. Foreign Affairs (2001). Retrieved September 15, 2009, from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/56654/william-pfaff/the-question-of-hegemony
- Record, Jeffery. The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Counterinsurgency. CATO Institute. (2006). Retrieved September 10, 2009, from http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa577.pdf
HIS330: United States Military History
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