Russian Learns a Lesson and Ignores Others
Introduction
Conflict between Chechnya and Russia, in the Caucuses region of Eurasia, appears at first to be a recent phenomenon, brought on by a desire of Russia to dominate and subjugate the continent; however, the history of this particular feud is not quite that simple. While war in Chechnya exploded violently in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was not the first time Russia found itself mired in conflict in this region. Continued instability in Chechnya is a direct consequence of a lack of foresight by the Russian government, and an inability to comprehend the physical, and more importantly, cultural geography.
Historical Context of the Situation
In order to fully understand the difficulties of Chechnya, it is important to understand the historical background of the bitterness the people of the region hold towards Russia, and why. As with most tribal cultures, the isolated mountain tribes of this region fought bitter battles between themselves, which trained them well in the type of guerilla warfare that would be necessary to maintain a consistent rebel movement spanning centuries. Geography coupled with guerilla warfare would not typically be a sufficient obstacle for most invaders, without a strong determination on the part of those invaded. The determination of these peoples has been handed down for generations, through a splinter branch of the Muslim faith, Muridism. (Tolstoy, 9-12)
This particular splinter came to the Caucuses in the third century, teaching equality among people, among other things, and ultimately forged a commonality among the people of this region that has endured nearly two millennia as a rally point. Over this time, Chechens have repelled every global power of the time, including the Golden Horde, which dominated Russia for centuries, but could never take control of the Caucuses. Indeed, as their power faded in the late 15th century, the Ottoman Empire must have taken note. Though they controlled most of the area, they never really bothered to attempt to subjugate the people of the Caucuses but did not shy away from attempting to terrorize them. (Amina)
The first concentrated effort to subdue the Caucuses came from the Russian front during the mid-1500s. The primary goal was to secure warm-water ports, so that they might better maneuver in to position to take control of the trading capital of the world at that time, Constantinople. Initial attempts were quiet and relatively peaceful, though attempts to populate the area with loyal Christian Cossacks to inhabit the area, and a later marriage between Ivan the Terrible and a local Karbardine princess from the north Caucuses, drew attention from the adjacent Ottoman Empire. (Amina)
By the 1600s, the region became a source of hot contention between the two powers that continued for nearly 100 years. Neither side succeeded in attempting to control the area though; they had yet to figure out how to control the rebellious mountain tribes of the Caucuses, much less overcome the difficulties of waging war against each other in the difficult terrain.
Departing from the feud with the Ottoman Empire in the 1700s, Tsar Peter the Great began to focus his attention on controlling the region through direct confrontation with the people of the Caucuses. Throughout much of the early 1700s, the Chechens repeatedly repelled Russian troops using guerrilla tactics. Peter the Great was never successful though, and passed the torch to his successor, Catherine II, who attempted to establish the Caucuses as the line delineating the extent of the Russian empire, with a series of fortresses and Cossack settlements, which was termed “The Greek Project.” It was not long after that, succumbing to years of war and oppression at the hands of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire, the king of Georgia appealed to Russia for protection. The Treaty of Georgievsk established Georgia as a protectorate of Russia, which aided in establishing relatively solid control of the area; one group still stood in the way, the Chechens. (King)
Muridism became a singular rally point during this time, when a religious leader appeared and aided in organizing the mountain tribes to continue their fight as a holy war against Russia. (Tolstoy, 159) Raids in to neighboring Georgia became commonplace and Russia responded in 1816 by sending General Yermolov, the Russian hero of the Napoleonic wars to control the region. His tactics only served to infuriate the Chechens against Russia. His methods were nothing short of terrorism; admittedly, he stated that we would not rest until all Chechens were eliminated. He began with a series of forts, the most of infamous of which is the current capital of Chechnya, Grozny, meaning “terrible.” (Amina)
From the forts, he set about murdering civilian women and children, claiming that they were all “savages and criminals;” he cut down the forests, which had consistently hampered military operations, and aided the guerrillas; as well, he destroyed farms and livestock to an extent that only his troops were capable of survival. Apparently unaware of the atrocities, the Tsar in Russia continued business as usual until informed of what was going on; by then it was too late. The Chechens had unified and entrenched themselves, specifically against Russian intervention. While the subsequent dismissal of General Yermolov by the Tsar in 1827 did usher in a time of relative peace for the people of the region, it did not erase the memory of the atrocities served on the Chechens.
The people of the area had begun to drift into the arms of a strong and popular Imam, Ghazi Mohammed ibn Ismail of Dagestan. (King) Ghazi’s ambition was to form a unified Islamic state within the Caucuses and was relatively successful among the people of the region, primarily due to massive anti-Russian sentiments, as well as the commonality of Islamic faith, through Muridism. Growing support of this movement led the Chechens into further conflict with Russia that would continue for another 100 years, primarily through terrorist campaigns by the Russians against the populace.
The Russian government consistently rejected continual offers for peaceful coexistence with Russian rule by the Chechens, primarily because of a singular stipulation, acceptance of Sharia Law for the region. (King) In spite of continuing campaigns of terror against the people, broken treaties with tribal clans, the Caucuses War, the Crimean War, near decimation of the Chechen population, deportation by brutal and murderous means, and even surrender of a prominent leader in 1859, the Chechens could still not be subdued. Chechen resistance continued in the form of raids in to Russia; Russian persistence continued in the form of murder and mass exile, and attempting to repopulate the region with Cossacks, as a reward for help against the Chechens.
Russia seemingly became more tolerant during the late 1800s, and a period of relative calm ensued, lasting until the Bolshevik Revolution. The Chechens pursued their religious identity, traditions, and education, with very little persecution; other matters were more important to the Russian government, requiring cooperation from these people. The discovery of oil in the region prompted alliances with French, Dutch, and English companies, who began to extract 1600 tons of crude annually. Pipelines, railways, and thousands of workers moved in, including previously exiled Chechens. The coalition of government and enterprise successfully thwarted sporadic attempts by disillusioned Chechens attempting to reclaim stolen lands, by continuing deportation of rebels, and land grants to Cossacks. (Amina)
Seizing the opportunity provided by the onset of the Bolshevik revolution, the Chechens quickly met and formed the Chechen Congress to act provisionally over an independent Caucus region. After a short feud with the Bolsheviks attempting to aid the Cossacks, in which neither side could really claim victory, the Bolsheviks finally agreed to guarantee the people of the area the right to govern themselves. Unfortunately forgotten in the civil war that followed in Russia, the “Reds” and the “Whites” struggled for power, through control of the Caucuses. While not supportive of their cause, the Reds quietly backed the Chechens after their declaration of independence, as they continued to fight attempts of the “Whites” to dominate the area. (Shah)
After the Chechens forced the Whites from the region, the Reds quickly sought to bring the Chechens in to their struggle, having already won the support of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The Chechens continued to view themselves as separate though, because of negative campaigns and violence against their culture, by the Reds. Rebellion ignited again in 1920, and the fighting between Chechnya and Russia lasted about a year before Stalin agreed to offer amnesty to the rebels, and the status of a Mountain Republic, in exchange for their recognition of the Bolshevik government. The Chechens agreed again, on the condition of official acceptance of Sharia Law as the constitutional law of the new autonomous region. Both sides agreed and the peace lasted for another year; lands taken by the Cossacks was returned to the Chechens, Arabic was permitted as the official language, Sharia Law dominated, and life was relatively calm. (Amina)
Stalin went back on his word a year later, perceiving the Chechens as a corrupting influence on the other members of the Mountain Republic, and sent troops to break up the growing alliance and create a Chechen Autonomous Oblast. A campaign of culture dissuasion began in Chechnya as the Soviets attempted disarmament of the people, attempted to rid them of the Arabic language, and began to eliminate Islamic practices. Efforts at disrupting the influence of Chechnya on the Mountain Republic were having the intended effect; that is, until Moscow attempted to enforce a crackpot scheme that was nothing more than a return to serfdom.
Soviet collectivization reignited the Chechen cause again and they rose up to force the Soviet hand by 1930. The Chechens again demanded their rights, and the Soviets begrudgingly agreed, knowing they could not stand against the rebels. Behind the scenes though, the Soviets were sending in detachments to arrest leaders of the movement. As most of the villages in the North Caucuses continued violent rebellion against collectivization, the Soviets had no choice but to withdraw their forces, give up on the strategy of collective farms in the region, and grant amnesty to political leaders of the movement. (Amina)
Future attempts to control the region found the Soviets reversing their previous intentions, attempting to combine the areas of Chechnya, Armenia, Georgia, Ingush, and Dagestan, hoping to dilute the resistance. Chechen resistance continued though, through raids into Russia began, as an attempt to move the war out of their home, into the homes of the Russians. The Soviets responded by continuing political oppression and forcing nonsensical and trivial cultural matters on the people; insisting on the use of the Cyrillic alphabet, requiring the use of the Russian language. Additionally, finally understanding the implications of the fortress that the mountain people had been pursuing their cause from, the Soviets attempted an expulsion of people to lowland regions in the north, which continued through the 1930s and 1940s. (King)
During World War II, the Chechens again seized the opportunity to antagonize Russia, working with the Nazi regime in Germany against Russia. Stalin responded after the war by executing one of the largest deportations witnessed, sending millions of Chechens to Siberia, and imposing brutal constraints on the region. In spite of this, Chechen resistance persisted, and the region remained in turmoil. After the death of Stalin in 1953, perhaps, realizing the futility of the situation, a massive project of repatriation of deportees began. Strict military authoritarianism maintained a semblance of order, but combat continued. As a way of life for both Chechnya and the Russian military, the region had developed a peculiar reputation of being the military training ground for Soviet officials seeking higher office. (Shah)
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, former satellite regions began to breakaway. Ingushetia, previously forced together with Chechnya, became an autonomous republic within the new Russian Federation in 1992. Chechen separatists under General Dzhokar Dudayev, seized power and declared their independence. Immediately denounced by Russia, President Boris Yelstin responded with troops, only to withdraw them as quickly, discovering that the Chechens were well-armed, well-trained, and had not lost any of their determination through all of the years of attempted subjugation and brutality at the hands of the Soviets. (Peuch)
Chechnya persisted in independence, with full support of native Chechens, and was relatively well organized and on its way to becoming a stable republic; the new Russian Federation had other designs though. Concern that if they permitted these regions to spin off to form their own governments, all of the Russia would suffer the same fate; additionally, oil reserves in the region were too valuable to simply abandon. Indeed, one the most prominent oil refineries, handling crude from fields in the Caspian Sea and Chechnya, linking Moscow, Ukraine, and points south were situated in the heart of Chechnya, Grozny. (King)
While Chechnya continued to ignore Moscow, and vice versa, life stabilized in the region (as much as it could). Diplomatic tensions continued though, and in 1994 Russia invaded Chechnya in what is now termed “The First Chechen War,” though it is obvious at this point, it is not first, nor will it likely be the last. Russia poured all of its military might in to subduing Chechnya, killing nearly 100,000 civilians, and destroying Grozny, but ultimately forced to withdraw in humiliation. The Chechens were too organized, too ready, and too determined; it was not a complete loss for the Russians though.
After Russian troop withdrawal, the provisional government could no longer control the militia, and local warlords gained strength. Having been terrorized by the Russians to near genocidal levels, with nothing left of their homeland, its economy, or a stable government, unemployed and armed Chechens were easily radicalized by Islamic fundamentalist that began to swarm in to the region, emboldened by the lack of a Russian military ability to secure the area. Anarchy continued to rule the region until 1999 and the outbreak of “The Second Chechen War.”
War broke out again in Chechnya, with Moscow accusing the leadership of harboring and supporting Islamic militants; while true, it completely failed to capture the essence of what had been going on, and what was really going on. The former somewhat stable Chechen legislature that Moscow had fought hard to remove in the first war relocated to Moscow, with Russian support, in an attempt to establish a sole legitimate authority, and refusing to negotiate with those holding power within Chechnya.
Russia continued to brutalize the civilian population of Chechnya, and the Chechen movement responded with renewed exports of terrorism to Russian cities, provinces, and surrounding breakaway regions. The most famous of these assaults was a hostage situation at a school in Beslan, in North Ossetia. On the first day of school, 1200 parents and their children were held hostage for three days, before Russian troops stormed the building in response to unexpected explosions. The ensuing chaos left only 200 or so survivors. These tactics have repeated on several occasions, by various Islamic factions seeking to push Russia out, and establish an Islamic state. This is not without cause and not without its own internal strife. (Peuch)
A Geographic Overview
Rising out of the steppes dividing Russia and Iran, this range of mountains is not a particularly formidable range like the Himalayas or Andes. Sharing many of the characteristics of its sister range, the Alps, it is different in that it is a natural fortress. The western flank of Caucuses is protected by the Baltic Sea; the eastern approach, guarded by the Caspian Sea. Approaching the mountains by land is relatively easy, crossing either of the open plains that spread out to the north in Russia, or to the south in Iran. (NatGeo) The mountains themselves contain densely forested valleys and ragged peaks that are difficult enough to navigate on foot, much less in mechanized transports; this is where the historically isolated tribes of the region choose to live, relatively safe from large-scale military incursions.
The Specific Geographic Impact on the Tactics, Strategy and Actual Operations
The ‘First Chechen War’ was a humiliating disaster for Russia. Attempting to invade Chechnya, specifically the capital Grozny, only served to emphasis the weakness of perception in the commanding ranks, towards physical geographic constraints. Urban warfare and guerrilla warfare in densely forested mountains were predominant. Heavily armed snipers were everywhere, hidden in basements, trees, upper stories of buildings, and any other conceivable location, and frustrated Russia constantly. Maps of the region were few and not readily available, much less adaptable; the rebel movement was intimately familiar with these surroundings, their culture built around them and upon guerrilla warfare, which ultimately negated the statistical advantage of the Russian military. (Perrin/Vroom, 12)
The Russian approach contributed to their frustration, more so. Like the British fighting the Americans, during the American Revolution, the Russian ground forces attempted traditional tactics, through traditional regiments and formations incapable of adjusting to guerilla warfare in mountainous terrain, and among the narrow streets and tall buildings of the capital, Grozny. Helicopter units that attempted to land in the mountains became easily lost, where everything looks the same. Troops deployed in the mountains often wandered for days, unaware of their location, and most ultimately ended up surrendering to Chechen fighters. In the cities, specifically Grozny, tanks sent to intimidate the insurgency and population, were unable to maneuver quickly and efficiently to counter threats. Poor visibility, due to narrow streets, and looming structures, made the tanks ‘sitting ducks’ for Chechens armed with anti-tank rockets, hidden from sight in surrounding buildings. (Perrin/Vroom, 14)
Further emphasizing the Russians failure to understand the conditions they were addressing was the lack of tactical preparation. Ignoring history, and perceiving that they could easily disperse rebellious civilians, with an excessive display of arms, Russia failed to prepare for the protracted confrontation that ensued; especially in the capital city of Grozny, where fierce fighting took place for more than a month. Russia had prepared for only a few weeks of confrontation; after two months, their supply line was in complete disarray, partly due to political interference, and unable to adequately supply its own troops with necessities, such as water and ammunition. (Perrin/Vroom, 15)
Russia’s air campaign during the First Chechen War’ was equally as flawed, though at first appeared to be a successful annihilation of opposing air capabilities. Closely clustered Chechen air bases, with no surveillance equipment, were easily disabled by an immensely superior Russian air force; Chechen air capabilities were mostly outdated and outmoded Soviet training jets, such as the L-29 Delfin and the L-39 Albatros. Unfortunately, these easy gains created an unfounded confidence in Russian air superiority.
Failure to widen the scope of air operational facilities, and provide for strategic support of ground forces, negated all initial efforts. After disabling Chechen air bases, Russians attempted to restore them for their own use and did succeed; however, the guerrilla factor was ignored again, and constant attacks by Chechen forces made the bases of very little use and forced the Russians to provide for excessive protection of the same. Forces in motion on the ground, again due to insufficient maps and reconnaissance, were unable to call in sufficient support, and forces in the air were unable to determine where and at what level support should be provided. (Evans, 9-11)
The Outcome
The result of the First Chechen War and the associated failure was the Second Chechen War. The Russians must have studied their failures intensely, because there were little to none of the same mistakes. Instigated by a series of attacks in Dagestan, Chechnya, by Islamic militants seeking to form an independent Islamic state, full scale war was initiated and supported by the Russian government and populous, after a series of vicious attacks on the Russian civilian population in Moscow and Volodonsk, which killed nearly 300 people. (Evans, 14)
The politics and command of the Second Chechen War were handled in a decidedly different way. It seems that the Russian military was in command of this situation, and found bountiful benefits in this arrangement, through nearly complete control of operations. Russia established air supremacy as quickly as in the previous conflict; this time strategic and tactical support was decidedly more informed, refined, and more adaptable to conditions on the ground. GPS and laser-guided systems aided massively in this assault, though continued to be somewhat frustrated by typical, unpredictable mountain weather conditions. However, the Russians probably could have cared less if there was a wider dispersal of bombs dropped under these conditions, as they provided for a wider level of destruction. . (Lutz, 35-37)
Massive, and extremely successful, bombing campaigns launched against specific targets, disrupted the ability of Chechen forces to move across established infrastructure. Chechen borders were sealed quickly, a heavily secured perimeter was established around the rebel state, and Russian forces operated primarily from this perimeter. Immediately, known rebel bases were again destroyed, and areas of concentrated guerrilla operations were isolated through the destruction of arterial routes and bridges.
After these concentrated efforts, bombing campaigns continued in a different format, for the direct benefit of ground troops, which were quickly advancing across the state; taking a page from NATO’s assault on Belgrade in the prior year, their goal was complete destruction of the economic and political structure within the country. Nothing was sacred; oil refineries, storage facilities, power plants, weapons factories, and any other means of production or financial profit were wiped out; indeed, the capital of Grozny was nearly leveled by the time Russian ground forces arrived. (Evans, 17-20)
With Grozny mostly secure, the assault turned toward the countryside; this time, with a better understanding of how best to handle guerilla bands hiding and moving in small formations. There was an advantage to dealing with situation this time; the borders were sealed, routes were not easily traversed, and the mentality of the Russian military was that no target was sacred; if something was moving, it was fair game, and was subsequently destroyed. Confronting guerrillas in the valleys, Russia took a page from the United States confrontation in Vietnam; fuel-air bombs were used extensively to reduce the rebel capability to hide effectively, while improving the ability for Russian ground forces to maneuver efficiently. (Evans, 23-25)
Summary
In recognizing the geographical mistakes of the First Chechen War, Russia was undoubtedly more adaptable to controlling the situation in the Second Chechen War and was able to easily eliminate organized resistance. Unfortunately, Russia continues to fail to understand the cultural geography, and historical context of continuing resistance. Guerrilla bands continue to operate in the Caucuses, and Russia continues their pursuit, though on a much smaller scale than the previous onslaught visited upon the Chechens.
Currently, Islamic fundamentalists are at war with those attempting to establish Islamic democracy; meanwhile Russia continues to pursue every military and political means to prevent secession of the war torn state. Approximately one-half of the Chechen populations are refugees in neighboring regions, some refusing to return because of accusations of Russian torture and executions; the people are not so much concerned about Islamic intervention, as they are avoiding another thousand years of Russian oppression. (deWaal)
Former rebel leader Akhmad Kadyrov took the office of President of the republic in spite of elections characterized by the Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as nothing more than ballot stuffing, voter, and candidate intimidation by Russian troops. Following his assassination in 2004; his son took the reigns and has been working closely with Moscow to aid former President Vladimir Putin’s personal war on Chechen terror. All of this leaves a very bitter taste with most Chechens, who view this as nothing more than continued Russian dominance, through traditional Russian means.
The younger Kadyrov stands accused of masterminding coordinated efforts to eliminate all opposition to Russian influence by terrorizing the general population. According to Human Rights Watch, his methods are no different than those used by previous illegitimate rulers and would-be invaders, including murder, rape, torture, kidnappings, and burning people out of their homes. (Lokshina) Indeed, these methods are no different than those attempted by the Ottoman Empire, Tsarist Russia, and Soviet Russia. What the current regime fails to recognize, is that these methods have never been successful. Consequently, the wars in Chechnya, for Chechnya, will continue as long as Russia perceives a need to interfere in the politics and culture of the region.
Complete Russian withdrawal may not be the end of the nightmare for Chechnya though. Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kardyrov faces strong opposition by native Chechens, Islamic fundamentalists, and those who wish to see an Islamic democracy; indeed, Russia may be the only thing that stands between Chechnya and an even more brutal internal struggle. Evidenced by tensions that often erupt in and around neighboring provinces, there is no clear solution to the difficulties faced by the Chechen people. One thing is certain however, further intervention by another group could be disastrous for all involved.
References
- Tolstoy, Leo. (1912) Hadji Murad. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.
- A Brief History of Chechnya. (2004) AMINA. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from http://amina.com/article/br_hist.html. Accessed 2009 Apr 10
- King, Charles. (2003 March/April) Crisis in the Caucasus: A New Look at Russia’s Chechen Impasse. Foreign Affairs Vol. 82 No. 2
- Shah, Anup. (2004) Crisis in Chechnya. Global Issues. Retrieved September 15, 2009, from http://www.globalissues.org/article/100/crisis-in-chechnya Accessed 2009 Apr 23
- Peuch, Jean-Christophe. (2005) Chechnya: Ten Years After – The Logic Behind the First Chechen War. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved September 17, 2009, from http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1056335.html
- Collegiate Atlas of the World. (2008) Washington, DC: National Geographic Society.
- Lutz, Raymond R. (1997) Russian Strategy in Chechnya: A Case Study in Failure. Air War College – Air University. Retrieved September 20, 2009, from https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_4d72797a-e38a-427e-9d45-63677d4ede70/display.aspx?rs=enginespage
- Perrin/Vroom. (2001) The Chechen War; Another Russian Humilation. National Defense University – National War College. Retrieved September 20, 2009, from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA442671&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
- Evans, Robert D. (2001) Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War. School of Advanced Military Studies – United States Army Command and General Staff College. Retrieved September 25, 2009, from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391341&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
- deWaal, Thomas. (2001) Chechnya’s endless war. BBC News. Retrieved September 25, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1292799.stm
- Lokshina, Tanya. (2009) Another Year of Ramzan Kadyrov. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved September 26, 2009, from http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/31/another-year-ramzan-kadyrov
GGH312 - Military Geography
